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MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE: LEGALIST, ANTONIMIANIST
AND SITUATlONIST STRATEGIES OF MORALITY
MANAGEMENT ACCORDlNG TO JOSEPH FLETCHER
Summary: This articlc prcsents thrce approachcs to morality management: legalist. antinomian and
situationist. II indicates che significance 01' the situationist eoncepnon of morality management for thc
eontempotary management ano management scienccs.
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Introduction
Axiological assurnptions play important role in the strategie management
theories and practice, bccause sornc valucs are ultimate aims of strategies and
criteria of efficiency. cconorny.'" success." and risk"s of actions.?" These eomments
can rise several qucstions: Are all values universal. or just same') Does the
managerial planning discover maral values, or it can create thern? Can or should
managers arbitrary deeide abour morał values? Thcrc arc sorne opposite general
answers to the above questions: realist versus antirealist. absolute versus
relativistic, and universal versus particular."(I
This article presents Joseph Francis Pletcher's (1905-1991) understanding of
legalism, antinomianism and situationism." As we will show. they imply rhree
partially opposite answers to the above qucstions - legalist (extremely realist.
(,(,Ackoff R. L.. Re-Creating t/w Corponnion. A Desie» ą( Org anizanons jiH" tlic ] l st Cen/liry. New
York. Oxford Universiry Press, 19991. Gossling T .. "The Priee of Morality An Analysis of
Personality. Moral Behaviour. and Sociał Rules in Leonomie Terms." Lonrnal ojBusiness Ethics 45.
no. 1/2 (June I. 2003). pp. 121-·131. Moorc G.. "Re-Imagining thc Morality of Management:
A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach." Business Ethics Quancrl, IR. no. 4. 2008. pp. 4R3-511.
'" Pruzan P., "Frorn Control lO Valucs-Based Management and Accountability." .lournal ofBusiness
Ethics 17.no. 13.IY98.pp. 1379--1394.
(iS Kcency R. L.. Ttn: Role o( Va/I/C!s in Risk Monugement, [in: ] The Annols oithe All1cricon Acodrmv
ofPotiticol and Social Science. Vol. 545. no. l. 1996. pp. 126-,,1~4.
r"'Frecman R. E., D. R. Gilbert. E. Hartman. talues and t/7(' Fourulations ol Strategie Management
[in.] JOl/mai o( Business Ethics. Vol. 7. no. 11. 1988, p, 822.
7{> Carroll A. B.. Models of Monagoment Morolitv for the New Millenniutn [in:] Business Ethit»
Quarterlv, Vol. II. no. 2. 200 I. pp. 365··271: Maclntyrc A .. Ahcr Virtne: A SIl/dl' in Morał Theorv.
Notre Darne, Ind .. University of Notre Dame Press. 2007: Rossouw G. J .. L. J. van Vuuren, Modes ot
Monaging Moralitv: A Descriptivr Modeł ofStrategics jor Afanuging Ethics, [in:]Juurna/ nI Business
Etliics. Vol. 46. no. 4. 2003, pp. 389-402.
" Fletcher is one ar founders. pioneers and best-known popular exponents of ethical situationism. Ethical
situationism can also be called "situauonism", "situation ethics", "situationa] ethics". "contextualism''
"consequeruialism" or "contextual cthics". Situarionism has also bcen called "ethical existentialism."
"cthical acrualism." "etbical individualism." "morality according 10 situations." The terms are effecrively
synonymolls. Rathcr than a cornpletc philosophical system, they rcter to a certain style of thought and
morality . developed in literature, as much as in cthics, See: Gusrafsen J.. COllie"r Verslfs Principles:
A .lhlplaced Debare irt Christian Ertncs. [in.] Harvard Thcological Revtcvv. 58,1965, p. 172: McConnick
R. A. (I9RI) No/col Ol) Mora! 771cologr 1%5 IhlOlIgh 1980. Washington. Lanharn, pp. 74-75. In this wark.
"situation ethics" nr "situationisrn" refer 10 ethics of'Fletcher.
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absolutist and universal), antinomian (extrcmely antirealist. relativistic and
partitular) and situationist (moderato realist, relativist and partieular). In
conclusions we will indicate the significance of the situationist answer to the above
questions for the conternporary management and management selences.
Fletcher developed his version of situarion ethics in reaction aga inst legalism and
antinornianisrn. He maintains that situarion cihics avoids the rnistakes of these rwo
approaches, while preserving their advantagcs. Fletcher does nOI develop any
cornplete eoncepnon of legalism and antinornianism. hut rather point out a Iew (in
his opinion essentia1) features of thcse approachcs.-:
Legalism
As Fletcher maintains legalists take individual situations as concrete
manifestations of "given" universal rules. This is the legalist (rnetaphysical)
univcrsalism. They assurnc that moral goods (speci lic morał values) are real
(objeetive) properties of objecis (actions, stares of affairs. procedurcs. ctc). This is
the legalist assurnption ot' the "intrinsic theory of goodncss" (intrinsicalismr." In
consequence, as he maintains. legalism dernands a respeet for some obiects. as if
they were intrinsically good.." As he writes. the legalist's "law-bound eonscience
rcifies good and cvil. trcating value as irit were CI thing-in-itself (Kant's Ding-
lin-sieli )... .',7j Fletcher assigns Arisrotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant
arnong others lo legalism. We will not discuss (he question of the relevance of the
situationist critique to these philosophers. The main objectivc of this section is to
outline (he situationist understanding of lcgalism."
Fletcher thinks that duc to the above philosophicai assumptions (universalism and
intrinsicalism) legalist theories fail to appreciare the inner dimension ofhuman actions
- their intentions. He accuses legalistic ethics of mixing rwo differing dimensions of
moralny: the goodness (Iovc, good will. good irueruion) and the rightness
("fittingness'") of actions, Fletcher refers to the traditional c1istinetion berween (lat.)
benvolentia and (lat.) bencficentia. =: He writes:
72 The words "lcgalist" and "antinornianist' ("'aminomian") can dcnote: (a) one who rnakes dccixions
according 10 legalisiic or aminomian methods of decixion making: (h) one o-ho is convinccd of
lezalism ar anrinomianism: ar (c) one who defends thcse approaches as thcories.
-:;~Fle[chcr.l.. Sttuation ethics .... op.cit.. 58. 66
"' Fletcher L Situarion e/hics.." op.cit.. p. 68.
"S Fletcher L, Situation ethics op.cit., p. (,7
"(,Fletcher J .. Situotton cthics op.cit.. p.16 SOI11C ihinkcrs havc shown how ihesc philosophers cnn
be iruerprcted lo avert (be! shortcomings of legaf ism as. indicatcd by Fletcher. Among others. see:
Haring B., Das Geset: Christi: Moraltheologio f)wgcs{cllt Fiir Priesu-r Und La/ell. Frcihurg lm
Breisgau, E. Wewel. 1957: Haring B .. DM"s oiMunipuhuion: łssur» in Medicine. Bchavior Comrot
and Gcuctics. New York, Seabury Press, 1975: Andersen R. K .. "Eihics o f Manipulation: ISSLlCS in
Mcdicine. Behavior Control and Gcnetics by Bernard Haring," .tournal (?flhe Amcricun .tcad emv oi
Religion 45. no. 2. 1977. pp. 265-267. Szosrek A.. Xatnro. 1'0:/11I1. woinosć: filozoficzna anali:a
koncepcji rwórczego rO::lIIHU we współczesne] reologii moralnej. Luhlin. \Vydawnictwo KL,:L. 19X9.
"F1etcher .I.. Situation ethics. op.cit., p.IOS.
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•• it is very important for us to be elear about the distinetion between good ar evil on
the one hand, and right and wrong on the other. Good and evil have to do with the
motives ar intentions of the morał agent - that is to say. the values he seeks to
serve. Right and wrong have to do with Dur judgrnent ahout the aet itself It is
entirely possible for a man with good intentions lo do a wrong thing, just as il is
ironically possible for a man with evil intentions to do the right lhing. An act is
right Dr wrong according to whethcr or not it serves the well-being of people. It is
go od or evil according to whether it is motivated by living concern Dr malice."
The author is aware that this distinction came frorn the "legalist" scholastics, Vel.
as he maintains, even where legalists distinguish goodness and rightness. their theory
of intrinsic goodness cripplcs the distinction. He finds legalistu rcdueing maral
goodness to legal rightness, and maral evil to legal wrongness and he artempt to show
that legalists tend to identify the moral with thc legalorder. Fletcher considers this
reductionism a necessary consequence of the theory of intrinsic value. '9
Fletcher believes that the above philosophical assumpiions indicate the legalistic
rnethod of decision making. As he maintains. in legalism:
e one enters into every decision-rnaking situarion encumbered with a whole
apparatus ofprefabricated rules and regulalions. Not jus! the spirit bul the Ictter of
law rcigns. lts principles, codified in mies. are not mercly guidelines or maxims to
illuminate the situation; they are dircetors to be followcd. ~n
Fletcher sees the legalistic morality as injuring both thc objects (the neighbor) and
the subjects of decisions. He points out that thc legalisin docs not care about people.
invoking legalists to serve rules rather than persons. In effect, legalism hurts ali those
who corne into contacr with legalists."
For Fletcher, legalism distorts the notion of justice, judging only the external
dimensions of hurnan actions, abstracted from their intentions. He points out exarnplcs
where a legalistle notion of justice leads to injustiee and to absurd solutions, where
innocent pcople sufler and "law wins"."
Fletcher maintains that [he subject ar legalisnc deeisions rnay suffer morc than
its persons-objects. in that he givcs up his freedom, decicling according to the
deduction of written law. As Fletcher suggests. legalisin warp s the cognitive
faculty of human eonscience. offering. as he adjudges, but a mechanical
consideration of "thc good in abstract", instead of considering real, conerete goods.
[n this way legalistic morality is reduced to the fulfilrnent of the law. and loses the
character of recognition of and responding to real imperatives. Fletcher stresses
that responsible deeision making involves knowing and considering the
consequences of action. By shunning the effort of caleularing consequences. he
clairns, legalists rnake irresponsiblc decisions - they choose the "easy way" of
..,~J. F. Fletcher. T. A. Wassrner. lic/lu. l.overs': .-111 lntroduction to Situation Ethics, Washington.
Corpus Books, 1970. p. 47.
7t/ J. Fletcher. Situarion erhics .... op.cit.. p. 134-145.
'" .l. F. Fletcher. Si/I/mion E/II/cs: Tli" Nev: Moralitv, Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 1966. p.1A.
" J. Fletcher. Siiuotion ethics .... op.cir., p.20-21 ..
'! J. F. Fletcher. Mora! Rcsponsibility: Suuutio» E/Mes a/ Work, Philadelphia, Westminster Press.
1967. p. 49.
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fulfillment of the law." As Fletcher maintains. [he legalist method of decision
making focuses on rules. and "it turns sclfish. childish. soft. subverting". S4 In
effect, he eoneludes. Icgalism leads to decisions agamst eonscience which are
immoral by definition."
Antinomianism
Fletcher considers antinomianism as a sort of polar opposite to legalisin. He
analyzes antinomianism at the examplc of existentialisrn oj' Jean [)aul Sartre, As
Fletcher maintains, the starring point for antinomianism is 'nausea'. which is "our
anxious experience of the incoherencc of reality.?" He maintains that this experience
has becn generalized by antinomians, who assume that every moment 01.'cxistence.
every situation. is radically diseontinuous. particular, indlvidual. unrcpcatable,
"without past or future. Therc is no web of li fe or connective tissue betwecn cpisodes
ar situations in human experiencc":". In conscqucncc. antinomians refuse "to adrnit la
any generally valid principles at all. nothing even ordinarily valid, to say notbing of
universal law5".~" As Fletcher maintains. the above assumptions justify the
antinomian method ar decision making. As he writes. according to the antinomian
approach:
• one enters into a decision-making situation 31l11ed with no principles or maxirus
whatsocvcr, to say nothing of rulcs. In evcry 'cxistential moment' or 'uniquc'
situation. it declares that one I11USl rely upon the situarion itsclf, there and then. to
provide its ethical solution.:"
ln spite of his syrnpathy for the antinornianism. Fletcher does not agree with the
antinomian radical norninalisrn and thc antinomian method ot' decision making. As
Fletcher rnaintains, antinomianism leads to thc ethical relativism. which " ... takes the
radical form ar de gustibus Ilon disputandum, 50 that 'What's one man's rncat is
another man's poison' ( ... ).""!! The autnor pouus out that this relativism leads to ethical
irrationalism, because - as he writes - "to be 'absolutely relative' (an uneasy
cornbination of terms) is to be inchoate, random. unpredicable. unjudgeable.
meaningless"." As he maintains the antinomian rnethod of decision mak ing leads to
accidental decisions. according to iastc. without any usc of cognition and reason."
Fletcher thinks that the antinomian method of decision mak ing can be rnore hann ful
than the legalistic one. For thc antinomianisrn jusufies selfish. irrational and risky
In.l. Fletcher. Sinearion cthics, _, op.cit.. p. 13X ·139
" J. Fletcher. Simotton ethics op.cu . p. 98,99.
:-:5 J. Fletcher. Snuotton ethic ..,· op.cii.. p. 137.
!olI, 1. Fletcher. Situotion cthics , op.cit., p. 24-5.
" J. Fletcher. T. Wassmer. f!ello. LOI"('r.\"' ... op. eit.. p. 63.
~lo! .r. Fletcher knows that somc cxistcntialists did not want to be so radical as Snrtrc. Fletcher poirus out
Simone de Bcavoir who "shrinks from candid aminornianism" HOWG\'cr. he states that her ontology "is
like Sarrre's. one of radica! riiscontinuiry" Fletcher .1._Situorion etlrics .op.eiL p.25.
:-ł'1 J Fletcher. Sitnasion ethics op.cit., p. 22.
'I(! 1. Fletcher. Situotton ettiics op. cit . p. 44.
(II J. Fletcher. S';luot;nł7 ethics o ••• op. crt.. p. -+4.
'I) ./. Fletcher. Simorion ethics .... op. CIt.. p. 44.
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decisions. Antinomianism is selfish because it demands no respect for other people. lt
is irrational, because it justifies arbitrary decisions. lt is risky, beeause it gives no
method to avoid hurting people."
Situationism
As Fletcher maintains, the prim my objective oj" situarion cthicS94 are dcsirable
actions and attitudes in its followers: "situation cthics is more ... verb-thinking than .
noun thinking It focuses upon pragma (doing) not upon dogma (some tencu.?"
Fletcher intends his theory to be pedagogical. helping people make moral decisions and
take mora l attitudcs, As he writes, situarion ethics "does not ask what is good but how
lo do good for whorn: not what is love but how to do rhe most loving thing possible in
the situation.',96 Situarion ethics aims at the projcci of morality - thc "new morality". lt
is the ultimate goal of situation ethics. Fletcher outlines it in three postulates:
law - questioned decision making:
love -focuscd decision mak ing:
- freedom -focused decision mak ing.
Law - Qucstioned Decision Making
Fletcher does not reject rnoral nonns and principles. As he posrulates. "[he
situationist cntcrs into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical
maxims 01' his community and its hcriiagc and he treats them with rcspect as
illuminators of his problems." " Fletcher just requires questioning the law (moral
norrns and principles). His inLenLion is LO claborate a metbod of questioning the law
and eheeking its applicability to the concrctc situarion.
In this way. situationism to sorne extend accepts the legalistic method and
rejects antinomian anarehism. Fletcher calI s moral norrus and rules "the wisdom of
community" He stressos their key role in the education of human eonscience.
However, he wants to avoid legalism in its absolutization of moral norms and rules.
As Fletcher states, "it may be, on same balanced view, that truc order presupposes
frccdorn and freedorn presupposes order. but just the same, it is the order that loorns
largest in the legalist's eyc."n In other words, legalists assume that every decision
based on law is morally valuable. 'i')
Love-Focuscd Decision Making
In love-focused decision making "Just [he same, he [the situationist] is prepared
in any situarion to compromisę [rnoral n0l1115 and principles) or set them aside in
the situarion if love seerns better scrved by doing SO."IOO
"' J. Hetcher. Situarion e/Mes .... op. cit.. p. 44. 103-1 J 9.
I}-I In this work , "situation ethics" ar "siruationism" rcfcr to ethics of Fletcher.
<J;t J. Fletcher.Sinratton ethics , op. cn.. p.52.
-'" .1. Fletcher. Sil/talion ethics op. cit.. p.26.
')7.1. Fletcher. Situmion etliics , op. cit.. p,26.
C)'~.I. Flctcher.SiIIlOlionerhics , Op.CiL p. 137.
<l().J. Fletcher. Sitrunlon ethics op.cit.. p.67-'X6.
1(l1).l. Fletcher. Situotton ethics , op.cit., p.2ó.
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Fletcher postulates that cthical theory sbould fOCli S on those moral decisions
that arc sharcd by diffcrent cultures and codes of eonduet by elaboraring on the
fonnal conditions of moral dccision-rnaking. Situationists assume that lovc (good
intention, lat. benevolcntiai is thc most universal featurc 01' moral actions.
Therefore, they postulate thar thc Iocus of dccision mak ing should be love. As
Fletcher maintains. the principle of love is forma I enough lO allow thc eonscience
of actors to make decisions based on the uniquc concreic moral mcaning of a
situarion. Love is material cnough, mcaningful cnough for aciion. lO avoid the
"random, unpredictahle" decisions ar antinornianism. :IJ!
Fletcher points out the commandment of Iove as thc cerc-norm of morality. Ile
stresses that all other norrus arc relative to thc commandment of love.lo, As he
holds, only by relativizing all norrus to lovc can (he uniqu« morał character of
siruations and the autonomy ofconsciencc and rcsponsibility of decisions. This is why
Fletcher accepts the principled ethical relativism. He stresses:
e Therc must be an absolute ar nonn of sorne k ind if there is to be any true relativiry
( ...) the ultimate criterion is ( ... ) 'agapeic lovc'. lt rclativizes thc absolutc. it does not
absolutiże the relativelllJ,
Fletcher points out two fonnal conditions of lewe: "good will" and "fittingness."
Geodwill is dircered toward the "well-bcing" of ncighbors. Fining dccisions
cffcctively prornotc that "wcll-bcing". Fletcher do es not maintain that a loving
attitude guarantees fitting actions. Fletcher is convinccd that this attitudc suffices to
reveal to the actor what is loving and fitting in concret« siruationx. For cvcn if a
loving actor has commitred an aet which is not fitting. he can correct bimself
because of this attitude. Therefore - aceording to situationism - the most important
practical purpose of rnanaging morality is 10 shape the loving atutudes of people.
This postulate has inspired eontemperary vinucs management ethics. ino
Freedom-Focused Dccision Making
The postulate of freedom-focused dccision making advances the freedorn of
subjects to decide what is fitting (right) in concrete situanons. i.c. what arc thc
fitting nieans to promoto hurnan well being. Fletcher holds that loving decisions
assume a risk that musi be undertaken. This risk cannot he avoided. It can only by
minimized by a careful calculatjon of consequences and by taking into account the
norrns, authorities and the sophia of thc subject's cornmunity: but ultimately it is
the subject who has to decide and this decision "is a matter of responsibility."
(Fletcher, 1966, p. 152). Fletcher is convinccd that. in the moment of decision-
making, "only the responsible sclf in tlu: sit nution dccidcs whether the sophia can
serve love there." (Fletcher, 1966. p. 33)
Situationism dcmands more than a passive responsc to the imperative given in
each situarion. Man rnust also be creative. This creativitv refers first of ali to the
JOl J. Hetcher. Situotton ethics .,. op.cu.. r.44.
!O~ J. Fletcher. Situarion ethics .. , op. cit.. p. 26.
\O.~ J. Fletcher. Sinianon cthics ... op. c it., p. 44~45.
t", Sce footnotes 117 and 118.
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domain of rneans: man must discover the bcst means to the end of Jove. This end is to
serve people, thcrcfore creativitv is the capacity to find the best possible mcans to
serve people. This creativitv cngages freedom.!'"
The Situationist Morality Management
Thc term "moralny" can be used cither "descriptively (o refer to same codes of
eonduet put forward by a society ar. same other group. such as a rcligion, or
accepted by an individual for her own behavior or normatively to rcfer to a code of
eonduet that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational
persons.' lOr. In this section "moralny" has the descriptive mcaning,
Not each cod e of eonduet is a morality (a code of moral eonduet or a moral
code of conduct). Morality contains specific norrus and rules. Thcy arc criteria of
moral assessment. They indicate the differencc between "right' and "wrong",
"good' and "bad", "jus!" and "unjust" actions (intentions. decisions. behavior.
emotions, attitudes) and their outcomes (consequcnces). Meta-etliical theories
specify the criteria and thcir relation to morał principles (values).
MOTality management consists in managing cod es of moral conducts. Morality
ean be the main objective or the side effect of planning. Usually mangers manage
morality en route of managing other objectives. As Andersen notices:
•• Managers deeide which principles are relcvant to a situarion and then use these
principles as a basi s for choosing values and developing standards that make
sense in terms of thc organization's tasks. Va1ue choices influence what
peop1e do and how they will do it. The ideas of what is right and what we do
usually merge with one another. Empowcring workers, for example, increases
individual motivation and eventually profit, an important organization goal,
whi1e preserving individual dignity. an important principle. Thus management
choices define the organization and the performance achieved. (Andcrson, 1997,
pp. 27-2R)
However Fletcher has not used the term "morality managemcnt". he introduccd
the concept of morality management into the eontemperary applicd ethics. As he
showed the three above projects of morality assume distinct methods of managing
morality: The legalist project of morality consist in a system of generał rules and
norms that are universal eriteria of goodness or rightness of actions. The legalist
morality management aims at fulfilling the law. II aims at introducing the moral
cod e 01' eonduet into practice. The antinomian marality management begins with
arbitrary decisions about moral principles and n0I111S. Eaeh subjcct plans morality
for himself or herself in order lo elaborate a project of his of her life. Situationism
requircs managing moral norms in order to respeet the prineiple of love. As
Fletcher suggests managers of societics should plan systems moral norms in order
to make people to respect the prineiple of Jove.
"" J. Fletcher. Situation ethics ... op. cit., 1'.152.
11I(. B. Gen, "Thc Delinition of Morality. ,. Stomord Encvclopcdia cfPhilosophv, ed. Edward N. Zalta.
Fali 2012. Retricvecl frorn http://plato.stanICJrd.edwarchivcs/fa1l20 12/entrics/morality-deliniti0I1I
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Situationists often express a desire to defentl traditional morality. ostensibly
limiting their motives to improving classical methods of applying traditional morality
to lik 107 Vet while Fletcher distinguishes between moralitv and ethics as a tlieorv
about moraliry, he terms his approach to ethics the "new morality". He does 50. not
only to spread snappy jargon among journalists, but hecanse situationism wants to
hring ethics as close as possiblc to practice. lt offcrs a thcory of morality which strives
for the greatest possible influence on people. Fletcher exprcss es this wish by subtitling
his book on situarion ethics "The New Morality."lli' This title docs not indicate a new
theory of morality. It indicates thc changc of morality. In order to cxplain the
situationist method of morality management, one has to distinguish moral principles
and moral norms.
Principles and Norrns. The Situationist Project of Morality
Some ideals indicate directions of management. For example the ideal of (lat.)
perpeturn mobile is thc implicit goal of projccting cconomic cars. 1119 The ideals may
exist or not. be possible or not. be real OT not. Somc idcals bclong to morality. They
are called "rnoral principles" ar "principlcs of moralny". Thcy are values: ultimate
ends and forms of moral actions. For cxample, the ulumate ends of human actions
are: happiness - according to cudemonism. human dignity - according to same
strearns of personalism, utility and human well being - according to utilitarianism.
According lo Immanucl Kant, the categoncal impcrative is the univcrsal form of
maral intentions. Etc.
One should distinguish morał J1(mTIStram maral principles. Maral principles are
non linguistic phenoruena. Moral norrus arc linguistic phcnomcna. Morał principlcs
are values, morał norms are criteria ar maral asscssments. Moral n0l111S indicate
methods of approaching, sustaining and supporung existence ot' morał principles.
outline the code of eonduet that is cornpatible with moral principles and optimize the
principles in human actions. For exarnple. if juslice is the maral principie. moral
norrus indicate the eonduet ofjust actions: ifhuman well bcing IS the moral principle,
moral norms outline mcthods of rcspecting and prornoting human well being. Etc. Jn
situationist ethics love is the prineiple of moral it)'. As Fletcher suggests. managers of
morality should promoto lovc and loving atutudes by managcrial effort of planning,
organizing and controlling morality and motivating people.
Morality management is sirnilar to value management and to morał
management in terms of organizing, motivating and controlling functions. Vet
morality management differs frorn value management and moral management in
respect of some planning functions. Value management and moral management
lO! "The label 'new moralny' is not a'togc-hcr justificcl. [ts mcaning in joumalism is a rclaxcd Ol' even lax
ethieal outlook. cspccially in matters sexual, Two things should hecorne elear as we proceed: (I) .hai Ihe
'new morality' is not cxactly nco,'. cithcr in metbod or in eontent. and (2) that as a method ,., its roots lic
securcly, cven if not conventionally. in the classical tradition of Western Christian morais It's an old
posture with a new and comemporary iook." Fletcher L Si/IIL1lio}) cthic: .. op. cit. pp.12- Ll
l(),~J. Fletcher. Sitnanon ctltics .. , op. cit, pp. 12-13
rov R, L. Ackoff, H. J. Addison. J. Mngidsun. Idealizcd Dcstgt): Crcaring enl Organi:(}tiol7 's Futnrc,
Uppcr Saddle Rivcr, }\.T}, Whanon SchooJ PubJi~hing, 2006.
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plan according to moral principles and norms. In these approaches, maral
d i I . 110 lprinciples and norms are not planned, because they are assume 111 p annrug. n
contrast, morality management aims at planning maral principlcs and norms.
As Fletcher shows. legalist morality management must be limited. In this approach
maral principlcs and norms cannot be planned (they have to be recognized and
respected). Fletcher believes that hurnan freedom requires rational choiees among
moral norrns and principles. In his opinion lcgalism does not allow for such a
possibility. In the context of the legalist theories moral pnneiples are ultimate criteria
of ranonality. and the only rwo ultimate options of planning moral principles are left-
for Ol' against rnoral principles. In the legalist approach choices against moral principles
are not rational (by definition). The rclativist ethical meta-theories assurne plurality of
competing moral cod es of eonduet. and thercfore they allow to plan morality in terms
of a rational choice among cornpetitivc moral systems.
The Jmportancc of Situation Ethics lor Management Selences
Situarion ethics has not becn a very original philosophical theory. Yet it has much
inspired centemporary applied ethics, because Fletcher bas drawn important practical
conclusion from bis ethical relarivism. As he maintains. the relativist approach
requires questioning morality. Especially managers can and should decide about codcs
of moral conducts and can manipulate them in order to achieve desirablc outcomcs.
Situarion ethics has evokcd widespread discussions. Despite. or maybe because of
its critics, it has enjoyed a wide following, particularly among those who feel "lost" in
the world of "things" and in the "legal srructures" of the state and religious
comrnunities. Many such people feel that these srructurcs havc tumed against human
individuality and freedorn, or have provcn unable to safeguard humankind against self-
destruction, as the two World Wars seem to show. Situationism has demanded from
politicians and institutions the mora li ty management in defense of human Ircedom and
the autonomy of human eonscience againsi the quasi-mechanical rules of social
structures and organizations. Many thinkers have sympathized with such posrulatcs,
without openly professing the tenets of situatiorusrn. They saw sorne of its positive
impacts on morality and saw situationism as a valuable contribution towards
eontemperary ethics. As Erwin W. Lutzer puts it,
• Although much of the debare which initially surrounded Fletchcr's writings has
subsided, the philesophy of situationism rcmains with us. Many who have never
heard of Fletcher or the word situationism cmploy his method of making moral
decisions. For this reason, an analysis of situationisrn is ever relcvant
[Flctcher's] writings provide the clearest sraternem of the new morality and the
popularity of his book Siturulon Ethics elevated him lo thc position of chief
spokesman for the situationists.'!'
I/{I C. Anderson. Valnes-Based Management; Iin:] Journal ot Business Ethics. Vol. 50, no. J, J 997,
p. 27: A. B. Carroll. Models cfManovemont Morolitvfor the New Millennium [in:] B/lS;'7eSS Ethics
Qnoncrlv, \101. 11. no. 2, 2001, pp. 3ó7-36~.
II J E. W. Lutzer. Thc Moralitv Gap: An Evangehcal Rcsponse 10 Situation Ethics. Chicago. Moody
Press. J 972, p. J 6.
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Although the name situationism is neithcr inl1uential nor well known, it is
extremely influential and well known as a method of morality management. It has
lost its appeaJ as a term. and the nam es of its proponents no longer dominate
centemporary ethics. yet situationism has not disappearcd lrom our ethies and
morality. Quite the opposite - its latent developmcnt has hecorne more inl1uential
than its "classica!" origins in the Sixtics. People know and affirrn the ideas of
situationism without knowing its name. lndeed. later.t situationisrn grows more
difficult to "detect" behind more sophisticated "eovers".I"
Situationism has reformulared the classical eoncept ot" responsibility (sec.
section Ol- The situationist coneeption of responsibility has bcen considcrcd a
promising tool to manage the current crisis ot" values and has been dcveloped
(though often without refcrring to situationism) in postmodern approaches 10
ethics, especially in the idea of CSR _.Corporatc Soeial Responsibility.!"
Situation ethics has strongly influcnced eontemperary biocthicx'!", the ethics of
lawl". and organizational and adrninistrarive erhics' "'. Siruationism eontributed to
business and management cthics by stressing the role of virtues l' and atutudes "
in managerial dccision making. Adminisrrative cthics and the ethics of bureaueracy
havc been inspired by the situationist critique of legalistu and antmomianisru.'!"
The situationist method of decision rnaking has intluenccd the plutalist conception
of organizations'<" and of managerlal practical reasoning.!" The ethical relativism
of situation cthics may have inspired (or at kast has bcen compatible with and
played the role oj" an introduction to) postmodern cthies.12c Same thinkers believe
that situarion ethies is the most proper ethieal model for marketing rcscarch. iC'
il2 R. Gunn. 711(!Philosophv ot Compentrnism. [in.] IJ1ICrłWliOJ1o! Revicw ot vlodern So('i%gy,
Vol. 18. no. 2. 1988. p. 208.
In A. K. Koźrniński, Zarzadzanie H' warunkach niepewności. Podreczni): d/o ::(Il1U'(lI7SOI1'(ll1ych.
Warszawa. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. 2004. p. 56.
li' /\. R. Jonsen et al., Spectal Snpplement: TlI(' Birth otBiocthics. [in.] TlIC l tastings Center Report.
Vol. 23. no. Ó. 1993; Childress L L. Reflections 017 Joseph Fletche: Żs uork, [in.] The Hastings
CCI/((!r Report, Vol. 22, no. I. I <'}92. p. 12.
II:' M. Pieniążek, Etvka Svtuacvjno Prawnikn. warszawa: \Yydawnictwo Prawnicze Lexis. 2008.
11(, E. B. Laverty. nie Ethical Context ot Administrcnive Dcrisions: A Fromcworkfor Anałvsis. [in: I
Pllhlie Administration Quanerlv. Vol. 13.110.3. IlJX9. pp. 375-~X7.
II' R. Kamiekar. Sitiuuionism al/d Virtue Eihics 011 the Content ot" (JI/r Choroeter. [in:J Ethics.
Vol. 114. no 3.2004. pp. 4SR-491.
ItS H. Harris./x Lun: o Management Firtue? [in.] Business & Pro!Css;0l101 Ethics Journal. Vol. 21.
no. 3. 2002. p. 180.
II') E. B. Laverty. J71e Łthical COI11l?Xl of' .•.tdministrativc Dectsions: A Framcworkjor :11/0~1·sis. [in:]
PI/blie Administrotion Quancrtv, Vol. 13.110. 3. 1989. pp. 377--37R.
!2\l E. B. Lavcrty. Ttw Ethical COl1leXI ofAdministrativc Dccisionx: A Framework lor Annlysis, [in:J
Public Administration Quarterlv, Vol. 13.110.3. 19Ko. p. ,,79.
'" O. O'Ncill, Practicai Principlcs & Practical Jndgmenr. linij liiI' Hasting» Center Report. Vol 31.
110.4,2001. pp. 15-23.
122 F. Debrix. ..Spectors ofPostmodernism. Derridas J/orx. (he ..\"(')1' lnterntnional and the Return nr
Sinunionism, [in:J Philosopliv & Social Criticism, VoL 25. no. I. 1999.
I)) G. S. Day, Ilre Threats io Marketing Research, lin:J Journal o(Marlcelin'!. Research. VoL 12.
no.4, 1975. p. 4(,2.
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Already in the Sixties, situationists were proclaiming that situationism would
becorne the most popular cthical idcology. I( seerns that their "prophecy" has to
som e extent been reaIized. Indeed. rcsearches eon si der that situationism to be one
of the most dominant typc of ethical ideology in managerial decision making.':"
Concluding Rernarks
The above analyscs have not aimecl at critiquc of situationism. They have
presented three approaches to morality. Icgalist. antinomian and situationist. This
paper has indicated the implicit concept 01' the morality management in
situationism and sornc of its influences on the contemporary management ethics.
lts eoncepnon of morality management descrves further investigation.Y"
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